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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

15 August 1950

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Korean Situation

I. Military Situation

There was little change during the past 24 hours in the ground situation. Task Force Kean continued to consolidate defense positions and to wipe out enemy pockets in the Chinju region. The 4th North Korean Division bridgehead in the US 24th Division zone was under pressure from Task Force Hill, with slow progress being made. A city of continuing build-up is taking place in the central zone with four North Korean divisions on line and two in reserve. ROK forces in the north were withdrawing to new defense positions under light enemy pressure. The situation in the Tongdok-Pohang area remains static.

UN naval forces continued close air and fire support of tactical troops. A landing party from a US submarine blew a rail tunnel on the North Korean east coast.

UN air action was limited to tactical support missions and interdiction of lines of supply.

Sector Reports

As the US 25th Division continued to consolidate its newly won defense positions south and east of Chinju on the southern coast, two enemy armored battalions of the North Korean 105th Armored Division (formerly reported as a brigade, but recently expanded) are reported to be moving into the area. This may presage a renewed enemy offensive by the still-resisting North Korean 6th Division in Chinju.

The enemy's bridgehead in the southern portion of the US 24th Division zone was under pressure from Task Force Hill, but stubborn enemy resistance and counter-attacks limited progress.

A continued build-up, now estimated at six divisions and supporting armor, along the west bank of the Naktong River facing the US First

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Cavalry (Infantry) Division and a division of the ROK II Corps denotes preparation for a major enemy assault in this area. The enemy probably is awaiting the arrival of more armor before launching the attack.

The northern front was quiet with two ROK divisions withdrawing to new defense positions under light enemy pressure.

The enemy forces in the Yongdok-Pohang area, tentatively identified as the 12th Division, continued to exploit the penetration; however, US Task Force Bradley, ROK Task Force Pohang, and the ROK Capital Division are attacking toward Pohang and Kigye against heavy enemy resistance.

UN naval forces continued to render air cover and close-support naval fire to tactical troops in the southern and eastern sectors. A shore-raiding party from the USS Bass (submarine) inflicted considerable damage on a rail tunnel on the North Korean east coast near the city of Songjin. Continual harassment of this single direct link between the Soviet Maritimes and the north Korean fighting zone will be reflected in the enemy's eventual logistical position.

UN air action was limited to close support and line of communication interdiction.

II. Other Developments

Commander-in-Chief, Far East, Tokyo, in assessing the effectiveness of psychological warfare operations, transmits reports from observers in friendly territory that there is good reception of UN broadcasts within the limitations of the available electric power supply.

The most effective themes of enemy propaganda operations are considered to be the US bombing of civilian and non-war installations to impoverish Korea; continuing North Korean successes demonstrate US inability to save South Korea; the Communist victory is inevitable; and tenant farmers to be given land without charge. The "victory is inevitable" theme is losing appeal, although the bombing and land distribution themes are still effective. Enemy black propaganda is spreading false rumors of UN victories in order to depress morale when the reports are proved false.

No significant announcements connected with Korean unification have been reported for 15 August. KIM Il-Sung, North Korean Premier,

however, is credited with having issued an order over Radio Pyongyang to his troops to drive out the UN forces by the end of August, since the longer this is delayed the stronger UN defenses will become. This type of broadcast may forecast an all-out troop and guerrilla offensive.

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